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1. Introduction 
Managers have to decide on the appropriate level of segmental information to disclose 
based on a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of reporting this information to the public and 
in relation to regulatory constraints (Lang & Sul, 2014; Darrough, 1993; Darrough & Stoughton, 
1990; Verrecchia, 1983). Managers may decide to report segment information broadly to avoid 
competitive harm (proprietary costs) or to preclude or combine segments to avoid monitoring or 
accomplish personal benefits (agency costs) (i.e. André, Filip, & Moldovan, 2016; Bens, Berger 
& Monahan 2011; Botosan & Harris, 2000; Harris, 1998). This study addresses segment disclosure 
choices in the European Union (EU) context; notably, most of the related research has been 
conducted in the context of the United States (US) (Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013). In particular, 
we examine the impact of the proprietary and agency cost motives on the quality and quantity of 
segment disclosures (SDQuality and SDQuantity) by using the largest firm in the EU.1 We also 
investigate the moderating impact of the adoption of the principle-based International Financial 
Reporting Standard 8 (IFRS 8) on these relationships by using data covering 4 years (2 years pre-
IFRS 8 and two years post-IFRS 8).  
The institutional environment in Europe differs from that in the US.2 The literature has 
demonstrated that the severity of the agency problem differs worldwide for various reasons (Shi, 
Magnan & Kim 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). For instance, the agency problem was observed 
to be less severe in countries with a more concentrated corporate ownership structure (Shi, Magnan 
& Kim 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), and the strength of legal protection and external 
                                                 
1 In this study, we use the level of geographical disaggregation to measure the quality dimension based on the argument that disaggregated 
disclosures provide more useful information than disclosures provided at a more aggregated level (FASB, 1997; IASB, 2006)  
2 The institutional differences include and are not limited to the level of ownership concentration, public enforcement, governance system, or the 
role of security regulatory organizations. 
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governance mechanisms influence the severity of agency problems between controlling insiders 
and outside investors (La Porta et al., 2002, 2006). The literature has also provided evidence on 
the variation of management reporting choices among countries; for instance, Liao, Sellhorn & 
Skaife (2012) revealed that German and French managers’ accounting and estimates choices 
significantly differed after implementing IFRS.  
Similarly, institutional factors have been found to diminish or increase insider’s incentives 
to manage earnings (Burgstahler, Hail & Leuz, 2006; Chung, Firth & Kim., 2002; Leuz, Nanda, 
& Wyscoki 2003), and early studies have found significant differences in how financial executives 
in US and United Kingdom (UK) perceive the net costs of disclosure, such as competitive 
disadvantage and potential litigation costs (Gray, Radebaugh & Roberts, 1990). Moreover, the 
objective of financial reporting, according to the joint framework of the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), draws heavily from 
the work of the FASB and has a strong decision-usefulness orientation (Whittington, 2008). This 
objective has been heavily criticised in the European context because stewardship has been folded 
into the overall objective and not presented as a separate objective (Zeff, 2013). The Proactive 
Accounting Activities in Europe initiative (PAAinE) has demonstrated that although stewardship 
and accountability are linked to agency theory, the notion is broader than resource allocation and 
should be a separate objective of financial reporting (PAAinE, 2007, p 16).3 In particular, for 
segment disclosure, users, on average, worry that IFRS 8 may help management to act in their own 
self-interest and manipulate segment reporting and argue that stewardship is more difficult and the 
objectivity of the reported information is questionable when a standard is based on the 
                                                 
3 The PAAinE group comprises representatives from European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) and standard-setters from France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. They have agreed to pool some resources and collaborate more closely so that Europe, 
as a whole, can participate more effectively in the global accounting debate. 
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management approach ( Aboud, Roberts & Zalata, 2018; Crawford et al. 2012; Berger and Hann 
2003). Thus, we consider reporting disincentives by using a sample from the EU to add to the 
understanding of segment disclosure reporting choices based on the substantial institutional 
differences between the US and Europe.  
Generally, IFRSs are a set of principle-based accounting standards that provide greater 
reporting discretion than rules-based accounting standards. IFRS 8 has increased the discretion 
and reporting choices, compared with its predecessor (IAS 14R). IFRS 8 replaced the modified 
risk and returns approach with the management approach; the core principle of the management 
approach is to report segment information based on the perspective of management (for details: 
Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013). Segmental disclosure is a unique area for examining the 
examination of disclosure disincentives because segmental disclosure is more focused on choosing 
not to disclose (Berger & Hann, 2007; Harris, 1998). Such a jurisdiction provides a setting to 
examine the moderating effect of IFRS 8 with greater discretion on the relationship between 
segment disclosures quality or quantity and reporting disincentives. The standard setters believe 
that the management approach improves the quality of financial reporting because users can view 
an entity’s operations through the perspective of management (FASB, 1997; IASB 2006).  
The FASB and IASB have conducted post-implementation reviews (PIRs), and a coherent 
conclusion was reached despite their differences, namely, the management approach resulted in 
the harmonisation of segment regulation and improvement in segmental reporting quality (FAF, 
2012; IASB, 2013).4 The principal sources of this evidence are public consultation (i.e. preparers, 
users, accounting firms and accountancy bodies, standard setters, and regulators and government 
                                                 
4 For instance, the US Financial Accounting Foundation’s (FAF) review addressed the management approach 15 years after its adoption, whereas 
the IASB review was conducted after 2 years. 
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agencies), outreach, and review of academic research5. Notably, after introducing any new 
standard, time is necessary to develop research on the effect of its application; thus, at first, final 
conclusions are based on a limited number of academic studies (IASB, 2013, p15).  
Moreover, according to the post-implementation reviews released by the FASB and IASB, 
stakeholders believed that some firms might use aggregation criteria or high discretion to avoid 
disclosing competitively sensitive information (proprietary cost motive) or information on 
declining businesses (i.e. agency cost motive) (FAF, 2012; IASB 2013). The principle-based IFRS 
8 introduces new disclosure requirements more likely to be associated with competitive harm or 
possible increases external monitoring. The standard requires the disclosure of revenues and 
noncurrent assets for individual material countries and from major customers with 10% or greater 
in entity sales. Therefore, the proprietary costs are more likely to increase if firms comply with 
this disclosure requirement. Nevertheless, managers may use the discretion inherent in the new 
standard to decrease the quality and quantity of disclosure for proprietary or agency reasons. For 
instance, IFRS 8 provides no clear guidelines on the materiality threshold related to the geographic 
disclosures of sales information by individual countries. Hope, Ma and Thomas (2013) and 
Akamah, Hope and Thomas (2018) have indicated that managers use the vague country-level 
materiality guidelines to aggregate geographic disclosures and mask tax-avoidance practices.  
André, Filip, and Moldovan (2016) examined the incentives of segment disclosure quantity 
and quality under IFRS 8 and found support for the proprietary cost motive; André, Filip, and 
Moldovan (2016) used the cross-segment variability in return;6 and our study uses the geographical 
disaggregation characteristic to measure the quality dimension and, in particular, the 
                                                 
5 For details on the post implementation process and output:https://www.ifrs.org/-/media/project/pir-ifrs-8/educational-material/pir-ifrs-8-
operating-segments-feedback-statement.pdf  
6 We calculated the cross segment variability and we found no significant changes following the introduction of IFRS 8.  
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disaggregation of sales information on a country basis. The disclosure of sales information on an 
individual country basis represents the highest possible level of disaggregation and provides 
information regarding specific sources of risk and returns that enable users to differentiate between 
potential risk, return, and growth prospects (Doupnik & Seese, 2001; Aboud, Roberts & Zalata, 
2018). In addition, we measure the SDQuantity by using an index to produce a relative score for 
each firm.7  
Such measures should provide a unique setting to examine the role of agency and 
proprietary cost motives in shaping the firms’ segment disclosure choices under the principle-
based IFRS 8 for two reasons. First, the literature has provided clear support for the changes in the 
quantity of segment information and disaggregation of geographical disclosure after the 
implementation of IFRS 8 (Crawford et al., 2012; Leung & Verriest, 2015; Nichols, Street, & 
Tarca, 2013). Therefore, an investigation of these two attributes should provide relevant and timely 
evidence on the firm-level compliance with IFRS 8. The discretionary nature of the disclosure 
requirement under IFRS 8 is the second reason. Under IFRS 8, the disclosure of key line items, 
such as segment revenue from external customers, interest revenue, interest expense, and 
depreciation and amortisation expense, are linked to the concept of what is reviewed by a 
company’s chief operating decision maker (CODM); thus, IFRS 8 permits non-disclosure if the 
information is not reviewed by the CODM. Moreover, although IFRS 8 provides more guidelines 
on geographical disaggregation than IAS 14R, it mandates the disclosure of sales information on 
a country basis only when material.  
                                                 
7 Our disclosure index includes both operating segments information and entity-wide disclosure.    
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Our results indicate that firms with greater proprietary costs provide lower-quality segment 
disclosure under IFRS 8. These results suggest that managers use the discretion of the principle-
based IFRS 8 to provide lower segment disclosure quality to avoid competitive harm. Therefore, 
although the quality of segment disclosure increased in post-IFRS 8 periods, IFRS 8 fails to force 
these firms with higher proprietary costs to increase their segment disclosure quality. We also find 
that firms with greater agency conflict, measured by the level of free cash flow, are more likely to 
report a lower segment disclosure quality and higher segment disclosure quantity. Managers 
choose to provide a higher quantity of disclosure to convey to shareholders that their actions are 
in the shareholders’ interest and to maximise capital market benefits, while at the same time they 
disseminate lower-quality segment information to hide inefficient decisions and facilitate empire 
building for their benefit.  
These results contribute to the discretionary disclosure literature by addressing the role of 
agency and proprietary motives in shaping segment reporting choices under the principle-based 
IFRS 8 by examining a sample from the EU. The results also provide feedback to the regulatory 
bodies in Europe regarding the role of segmental reporting quality in assessing the stewardship 
and accountability of management. In particular, the results are consistent with the notion that 
segment information is pivotal for the accountability of directors of a business entity to its owners 
and the public and suggests the necessity of stewardship as a separate objective of financial 
reporting. For instance, Akamah, Hope and Thomas (2018) indicated that firms with tax-avoidance 
practices provide less transparent geographic disclosures to avoid monitoring and accountability. 
The results also provided evidence regarding IFRS 8 compliance and asserted the significance of 
country-by-country reporting.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the background. 
Section 3 presents a literature review and hypotheses development. Section 4 explains the research 
design, and section 5 presents the main empirical findings. Section 6 shows the additional analyses, 
and section 7 concludes. 
2. Background 
The IASB introduced IFRS 8 as part of a short-term convergence project with the FASB 
to replace the revised IAS 14R for the annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009, with 
earlier application permitted.8 The objective of IFRS 8 was to have firms disclose information that 
would enable users of its financial statements to evaluate the nature and financial effects of the 
different business activities it engages in and the economic environments in which it operates 
(IASB, 2006, para. 1). 
IFRS 8 followed the US Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 131 in using 
the full management approach. In the full management approach, financial information must be 
reported on the same basis as that used internally for evaluating operating segment performance 
and deciding how to allocate resources to operating segments (IASB, 2006). IFRS 8 has an 
advantage over its predecessor (IAS 14R) because the information used by the internal 
management should be disclosed to external users, which would enhance relevance attributes. 
Notably, IFRS 8, as a principle-based standard, allows much more discretion than IAS14R, which 
could be abused by management.   
IFRS 8 requires reportable segments be identified on the basis of internal reports regarding 
the components of the entity regularly reviewed by the CODM (IASB, 2006). Therefore, 
                                                 
8 For details on the road to convergence and IFRS 8 and a historical perspective of segment reporting standards (Nichols, Street, & Cereola, 
2012; Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013) 
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reportable segments may be based on lines of business, geographic location, or a combination of 
the two (mixed). IFRS 8 requires disclosure on reportable segments and entity-wide disclosures. 
For each reportable segment, information on profit or loss and total assets should be disclosed. 
Other items, such as revenue from external customers, revenue from transactions with other 
operating segments of the same entity, interest revenue, interest expense, and depreciation, are 
required when included in either the measure of segment profit or loss or otherwise regularly 
provided to the CODB (IASB, 2006).  
In addition, IFRS 8 requires entity-wide disclosures, such as narrative information on 
products or services, revenue and noncurrent assets by country of domicile and individual foreign 
country if material, and revenues from transactions with major customers subject to the condition 
of 10% or more of an entity’s total revenues (IASB, 2006). Notably, IFRS 8 permits the non-
disclosure of entity-wide information when the necessary information is unavailable, and the cost 
of development would be excessive (IASB, 2006). Although IFRS 8 provides an explicit threshold 
for defining when an operating segment or major customer is reportable, the determination of 
materiality regarding individual countries is left to management’s judgement (Cereola et al., 2017; 
Doupnik & Seese, 2001). 
Several attributes make segmental disclosure a fertile environment for examining 
management disclosure choices, such as its discretionary nature (Berger & Hann, 2003; Hope & 
Thomas, 2008; Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013). The literature has documented the agency and 
proprietary costs as the two dominant motives for precluding segment disclosures (Berger & Hann, 
2003, 2007; Ettredge et al., 2006; Harris, 1998; Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013). Under the agency 
motive, managers are motivated to hide segment information to achieve personal benefits or 
engage in strategic reporting that limits the monitoring and usefulness of accounting information 
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(Bens, Berger & Monahan 2011; Wang et al., 2011). In other words, managers are motivated to 
preclude segment information as a method of covering up inefficient decisions and avoiding 
external monitoring (Hope & Thomas, 2008; Cho, 2010). Hope, Ma and Thomas (2013) 
documented that managers avoid voluntary disclosure of geographical earnings to mask tax-
avoidance behaviour following SFAS 131. Likewise, Akamah, Hope and Thomas (2018) observed 
that multinational firms with tax-avoidance practices tend to aggregate their geographic 
disclosures. Therefore, geographic disclosures and, in particular, country-level disclosures would 
be key in solving issues related to stewardship and accountability of multinational firms. 
From a proprietary motive perspective, segmental reporting provides insights into the risk 
and return facing each part of the business (i.e. activities and markets). Thus, managers may engage 
in strategic reporting to avoid revealing strategic or proprietary information to competitors (Clinch 
& Verrecchia, 1997; Verrecchia, 2001). Consequently, this study has two objectives: to investigate 
the proprietary and agency motives as incentives for reporting lower segment disclosure quantity 
and quality by using the largest EU firms and address the moderating effect of IFRS 8 on the 
relationship between reporting disincentives and segment disclosure quantity and quality.  
3. Literature review and hypothesis development   
3.1 Segmental disclosure and proprietary cost 
Discretionary disclosure theory suggests that proprietary cost is an important reason for 
withholding material information and introducing it extends the possible interpretations of 
information withholding (Clinch & Verrecchia, 1997; Verrecchia, 1983, 2001). Regarding the 
empirical perspective, several studies have examined the association between proprietary cost and 
segment disclosures. In an early study, Harris (1998) showed that operations in less-competitive 
industries are less likely to be reported as industry segments. Ettredge (2002) found that large firms 
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operating in highly concentrated industries report highly aggregated segment information under 
SFAS 14 and their lobbying position against SFAS 131 is motivated by the proprietary cost 
hypothesis. Similarly, Ettredge et al. (2006) and Wang et al. (2011) showed that proprietary cost 
acts as a motive to conceal the cross-segment variability of earnings and its growth.  
Specifically, Tsakoumis et al. (2006) revealed that firms with higher potential competitive 
costs provide less-detailed geographical disclosures, and Ellis, Fee & Thomas (2012) reported 
strong evidence that firms with a high proprietary cost are more likely to mask the identities of 
their major customers. By using an international sample, Nichols and Street (2007) found a 
significant negative relationship between disaggregation of segment information and abnormal 
return and suggested that managers used discretion in segment standards (IAS 14R) to protect 
excess profit. Consistent with these studies, the following hypothesis is stated: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between segment disclosure quantity/quality and 
proprietary cost.  
 
3.2 Segmental disclosures and agency cost  
A second incentive for masking segment information is agency conflict. Conflict of 
interest, according to the agency theory, infers that managers do not always act in the best interests 
of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The literature has also established that multi-segment 
firms’ poor performance may result from inefficient and even deliberately poor allocation of 
internally generated funds (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Martin & Sayrak, 2003). For instance, Stultz 
(1990) revealed that inefficient decisions, such as overinvestment and underinvestment, occur due 
to an information gap between managers and shareholders (i.e. agency problem) and the inefficient 
use of free cash flow. Berger and Hann (2007) and Bens, Berger & Monahan (2011) used different 
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methodologies and measures and consistently revealed that in the presence of the agency problem, 
managers aggregate segments to mask information regarding poorly performing segments or to 
suppress information on inefficient internal capital transfers. Furthermore, Wang et al. (2011) 
concluded that the presence of an agency problem is a motive to cover the differences in segment 
earnings growth or, at least, to reveal small differences.  
By using a sample from Europe, André, Filip, and Moldovan (2016) supported the agency 
cost proposition, but only when comparing under-disclosers with box-ticker groups.9 Similarly, 
we intend to provide insights into the role of the agency motive after the introduction of IFRS 8 
by using a sample from the EU covering 4 successive years, which contrasts with the majority of 
similar research conducted using US data. Consistent with the literature, we expect a lower quality 
and quantity of segment disclosure when the agency cost motive is present. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is stated:  
H2: There is a negative relationship between segment disclosure quantity/quality and 
agency cost.  
 
 
3.3 Effect of IFRS 8 on the explanatory power of proprietary and agency costs 
The principle-based IFRS 8 adopts the management approach that focuses on relevance 
and judgement, rather than detailed guidelines. Generally, IFRS 8 has increased the level of 
discretion and reporting choices compared with its predecessor (IAS 14R); the core principle of 
IFRS 8 is to report segment information through the perspective of management (IASB, 2006). 
                                                 
9 André, Filip, and Moldovan (2016) defined box-tickers as those that stick strictly to the standard’s suggestions and disclose the same number of 
line items as mentioned in the standard.  
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The standard mandates the disclosure of profit or loss measures and assets for each reportable 
segment and allows for the non-disclosure of all other items if this information is not regularly 
reviewed by the CODM or the preparation cost is excessive (IASB, 2006). By contrast, the 
standard requires the disclosure of sales and noncurrent assets by an individual country, but only 
when an individual country is material, which again suggests greater discretion and flexibility 
under IFRS 8.  
André, Filip, and Moldovan (2016) examined the determinants of segment disclosure 
quantity and quality under IFRS 8 and found support for the proprietary cost motive. Nevertheless, 
their study covers only 1 year of data and ignores the managers’ incentives in pre-IFRS 8. Our 
study addresses how the principle-based IFRS 8 shapes the role of reporting incentives by using 
data for 4 successive years and considering the pre- and post-IFRS 8 periods.10 Furthermore, we 
measure segment information quality differently. André, Filip, and Moldovan (2016) used the 
cross-segment variability in return,11 but our study uses the geographical disaggregation 
characteristic to measure the quality dimension and, in particular, the disaggregation of sales 
information on a country basis.  
Although the quantity and quality of segment disclosures have changed significantly since 
the implementation of IFRS 8 (Crawford et al., 2012; Leung & Verriest, 2015; Nichols, Street, & 
Cereola, 2012), these changes do not eliminate managers’ proprietary or agency motives to conceal 
segment disclosures. Lee, Walker, & Christensen (2008) argued and found that preparers’ 
incentives are more relevant to the quality of financial communication than accounting standards, 
                                                 
10 Their findings were reported only when the sample was divided into three groups (High, Avg., and Low disclosers). André, Filip, and Moldovan 
(2016) found no significant associations with agency costs and proprietary costs when continuous measures of segment information quantity and 
quality were employed.  
11 We calculated the cross-segment variability and found no significant changes following the introduction of IFRS 8.  
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and Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) found that high-quality accounting standards produce low 
financial reporting quality in East Asian countries in the presence of preparer incentives. 
Furthermore, Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2013) argued that IFRSs are of lower quality if managerial 
discretion is increased, given that managers have incentives to exercise their discretion in their 
interests. Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2015) demonstrated that reporting incentives dominate 
accounting standards in determining accounting quality, and that the adoption of IFRS has not led 
to higher quality accounting when the preparers have incentives to not disclose certain information.   
The agency and proprietary cost motives are major concerns for users and preparers under 
IFRS 8, and their influences on firms’ segment disclosure choices under IFRS 8 remain unclear 
(Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013). A major concern of the management approach is the requirement 
to disclose information that has been prepared and measured for internal management decisions, 
rather than information prepared in accordance with IFRSs for stewardship and external user 
decisions (Crawford et al., 2012). The post-implementation reviews of the IASB and FASB 
indicate that some investors disputed the management approach, arguing that it may help managers 
mask or hide loss-making and poorly performing segments (FAF, 2012; IASB, 2013). In addition, 
the management approach of IFRS 8 depends on the discretion  of the CODM to decide the 
structure and level of segments’ disaggregation and how certain items are to be measured and 
reported. Thus, we expect that the high discretion levels under IFRS 8 make it easier for managers 
with reporting disincentives to decrease the quality and quantity of disclosures and thus the 
explanatory power of agency and proprietary costs would increase in post-IFRS 8 periods. The 
following two hypotheses are stated: 
H3: The negative relationship between segment disclosure quantity/quality and proprietary 
cost increased after IFRS 8 implementation (became more negative). 
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H4: The negative relationship between segment disclosure quantity/quality and agency cost 
increased after IFRS 8 implementation (became more negative). 
 
4. Research method 
4.1 Sample selection  
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of managers’ reporting choices on the 
quality and quantity of segment information in the EU and how the adoption of the principle-based 
IFRS 8 affects this impact. The final sample of the study consists of the top 208 nonfinancial firms 
in the EU after exclusion of early adopters, based on the Financial Times list as of 30 March 2011. 
We exclude firms that adopted IFRS 8 prior to its mandatory application date for several reasons. 
Firstly, the inclusion of early adopters would mean adding 2 further years (namely 2005 and 2006) 
to represent pre-IFRS 8, which increases the factors that could confound the findings. Secondly, 
this will add to the complexity of identifying pre- and post-IFRS 8 periods because some firms 
have a non-December year end. Furthermore, the number of observations in these 2 years are 
expected to be relatively few, compared with the other years, which might also affect the 
robustness of the results. The period of study is from 2007–2010 because IFRS 8 
became effective for annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009. Therefore, the 
pre-periods are 2007 and 2008 and post-periods are 2009 and 2010.  
 Segment information was manually collected from the annual reports of the firms. The 
sample includes firms from 15 countries, with the majority from the UK, France, Germany, and 
Sweden, and this distribution is consistent with the sample distribution in prior cross-country 
studies (e.g. Daske et al. 2008; Leung & Verriest, 2015). The number of observations used in the 
regressions is 540 firm-year observations (Panel B). The firm-year observations are equally 
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distributed between pre- and post-IFRS 8 and firms are matched over the two periods. Table 1 
shows the sample distributions across countries (Panel B) and industries (Panel C).    
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Table 1: Sample size  
Panel (A) Number of observations used in regression 
Sample No. of Firm Years 
Initial sample  832 
Less: Firms’ years with non-December year-ends 132 
Less: Missing observations  160 
Final number of observations used in the regression*  540 
* The final number of observations are equally distributed between pre- and post-IFRS 8 and firms matched over the two periods. 
 
Panel (B) Sample distributions across country 
Country                                                        No. of firm’s years 
Austria 12 
Belgium 16 
Denmark 20 
Finland 8 
France 100 
Germany 60 
Greece 8 
Ireland 16 
Italy 32 
Netherlands 24 
Poland 8 
Portugal 12 
Spain 32 
Sweden 52 
UK 140 
Total 540 
 
Panel (C) Sample distributions across industry. 
Sector                                                                                                                                    No. of firm’s years 
    
Basic Material 84 
Consumer Goods 88 
Customer Service 60 
Health Care 28 
Industrial 152 
Oil & Gas 36 
Technology 20 
Telecommunication  24 
Utilities 48 
Total 540 
Notes: Table 1, panel (A) presents the construction process for the final number of observations used in regressions. Panel B 
presents the distribution of the sample across countries. Panel C presents the distribution of the sample across industry.   
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4.2 Research models and variables measurements 
The following regression models address the disincentives of SDQuantity and SDQuality under 
IFRS 8:12  
   
𝑺𝑫𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒕  =   𝜶
+ 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝑽𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑵𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑨𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑪𝒀𝒊𝒕 + +𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝑴𝑽𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟒 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑵 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝑨𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑪𝒀 +  𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑷𝑳𝑬𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑳𝑶𝑩𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑴𝑨𝑵𝑼𝑭𝒊𝒕   
+  𝜷𝟖𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬 𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝒊𝒕 +  +𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑳𝑬𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕  + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑵𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑪𝑬 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑪𝑻𝒕𝒊𝒕   𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Model (1) 
   
𝑺𝑫𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒕  =   𝜶
+ 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝑽𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑵𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑨𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑪𝒀𝒊𝒕 + +𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝑴𝑽𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟒 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑵 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝑨𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑪𝒀 +  𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑷𝑳𝑬𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑳𝑶𝑩𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑴𝑨𝑵𝑼𝑭𝒊𝒕   
+  𝜷𝟖𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬 𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝒊𝒕 +  +𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑳𝑬𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕  + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑵𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑪𝑬 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑪𝑻𝒕𝒊𝒕   𝜺𝒊𝒕 
                                                                                                                                                                     Model (2) 
The main variables of interest are the proprietary cost (thereafter MVGROWTH and CAPINTEN), 
agency cost (AGENCY), and their interactions with IFRS 8. The models control for IFRS 8 impact 
(IFRS 8), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), profitability (PROFIT), segment structure 
(LOB), complexity (COMPLEX), and country-level enforcement and protection (ENFORCE and 
PROTECT). Table (2) summarises the definitions of the variables in our models.  
  
                                                 
12 The robust cluster technique by company is used as suggested in Petersen (2009). 
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Table 2: Variables definitions 
Variable  Definition  Source 
 
SDQuality  
Dependent variables  
Proportion of firm sales disclosed by 
individual country. 
 
Annual Report 
SDQuantity  Disclosure score based on the total 
number of items reported in the segmental 
notes. 
Annual Report 
 
MVGROWTH  
Proxies for proprietary cost  
Market value growth measured as 1-year 
market capitalisation growth, current 
year’s market capitalisation/last year’s 
market capitalisation – 1) * 100.  
 
DataStream  
CAPINTEN Weighted average of property, plant, and 
equipment for all firms in the same 
industry scaled by total assets; market 
share, calculated as the ratio of firm sales 
to industry aggregate sales, is used as the 
weight. This an inverse measure of 
proprietary cost. 
DataStream  
 
AGENCY 
Proxies for agency cost  
Agency cost measured by the free cash 
flow per share represents the cash earnings 
per share, net of capital expenditures, and 
total dividends paid by the firm.  
 
DataStream  
 
IFRS 8 
Control variables                                                                      
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if time 
t is post the adoption of IFRS 8 and 0 
otherwise.  
Annual Report 
COMPLEX Average of the number of segments: 
(business segments + geographic 
segments)/2. 
Annual Report 
LOB A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm 
‘i’ defined as LOB and 0 otherwise.  
Annual Report 
SIZE   Natural logarithm of total assets at the end 
of t. 
DataStream 
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PROFIT Natural logarithm of operating income 
represents the difference between sales 
and total operating expenses. 
DataStream 
MANUF A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm 
‘i’ is manufacturing and 0 otherwise.  
DataStream 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt/total assets. DataStream 
ENFORCE Index of public enforcement aggregating 
whether suspect corporate transactions 
can lead to fines or jail sentences for 
wrongdoers or approving bodies; high 
values indicate a high intensity of public 
enforcement. 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
PROTECT  Antidirector rights index. An aggregate 
measure of minority shareholder rights 
that ranges from 0 –5. 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
 
4.3 Segment information measurement 
 Disclosure index is used to measure the SDQuantity. The selection of items was based on 
an analysis of the standard and a literature review. The initial disclosure list was then checked 
during a pilot study of 20 firms from various sectors and countries. This pilot test resulted in the 
removal of items such as order backlog and the addition of other items such as exceptional items. 
This removal and addition resulted in a list of 53 items comprising two subindices: the first 
contains 38 items relevant to operating segments, and the second includes 15 items relevant for 
entity-wide disclosures13. The index is unweighted with an item scoring 1 if it is disclosed and 0 
otherwise, except for reconciliation items, which were scored as two if detailed items were 
provided.  
To minimise applicability problems (Cooke, 1989; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Meek, 
Roberts & Gray, 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995), the relative disclosure score 
                                                 
13 The disclosure index is available upon request.  
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(RDI) is calculated as the percentage of actual score awarded to the maximum possible score for 
each firm. For example, if no difference is observed between the sum of segment revenue and 
group revenue, the reconciliation item is not applicable, and the firm is not penalised for non-
disclosure. Other examples include exceptional items and discontinued items, which are 
considered applicable if disclosed in the consolidated financial statements.  
A large body of research has viewed the level of disaggregation as an appropriate proxy 
for disclosure quality by arguing that the utility of segment information is positively related to the 
number of segments reported or disaggregation of the information provided (i.e. Aboud, Roberts 
& Zalata, 2018; Bens & Monahan, 2004; Emmanuel et al., 1999). The main objective of segment 
reporting is to provide users with incremental information beyond firm-wide information. 
Therefore, the disaggregation of segment information is important, that is, disaggregated 
information is more likely to enable users to evaluate the nature and financial effect of business 
activities and the economic environment in which they operate (Berger & Hann, 2003; Doupnik 
& Seese, 2001; IASB, 2006). In addition, the disaggregation measures involve using various 
objective calculation rules and have been widely used as a proxy for disclosure quality (Aboud, 
Roberts & Zalata, 2018; Bens & Monahan, 2004; Bens, Berger & Monahan 2011; Berger & Hann, 
2003, 2007; Harris, 1998; Nichols & Street, 2007). Furthermore, the literature has theorised that 
disaggregation of segment information improves the predictability of earnings and sales 
information (i.e. Herrmann; 1996; Herrmann & Thomas, 1997; Hussain 1997).  
This study uses the country-level disaggregation of sales information. Country-specific 
information represents the highest possible level of disaggregation and its usefulness may be 
observed in the demand of financial analysts and others for country-by-country information 
(Aboud, Roberts & Zalata, 2018; Doupnik & Seese, 2001; FASB, 1997; IASB, 2006). For 
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example, knowing that 60% of sales are from one named country is likely to be more important to 
than knowing, for a second firm, that each of three named countries account for 10% of sales. 
Therefore, this study employs the country-level disclosures (SDQuality) to measure the quality of 
segment information.14 Segment disclosure quality (SDQuality) is calculated as the proportion of 
firm sales disclosed by an individual country.15 The finest information set would be when 100% 
of firm sales are disclosed by individual countries. All segment information was manually 
collected from the annual reports.  
4.4 Independent variables’ measurement 
The measurement of proprietary cost is complicated, and several measures have been used 
in the literature (Bozanic Dietrich & Johnson, 2017, André, Filip & Moldovan 2016,Wang et al., 
2011; Li 2010; Berger & Hann 2007; Bamber and Cheon 1998; Ali, Klasa & Yeung.2014; Lang 
& Sul, 2014). In this study, we use two proxies. The first proxy is MVGROWTH, and Bamber and 
Cheon (1998, p. 171) argued that proprietary cost is positively associated with firm-specific growth 
opportunities. Growth opportunities indicate the availability of profitable investments; therefore, 
firms with high growth are more likely to suffer from competitive harm if they disclose information 
of a proprietary nature. Thus, this study hypothesises that managers of firms with higher growth 
are more likely to conceal information that could harm that growth. We define growth as market 
capitalisation growth, that is, 1-year growth in market capitalisation, and extract the data from 
DataStream16.  
                                                 
14 We measure country-level disclosures regardless of whether the firms define operating segments based on lines of business (LOB) or 
geographic location. For companies that do not define operating segments based on geographic location, IFRS 8 requires information about 
geographic areas to be provided as part of entity-wide disclosures. 
15 Companies with domestic sales only or that operate in only one country were excluded. 
16 One-year market capitalization growth is calculated as the current year’s market capitalization/last year’s market capitalization – 1)*100 
(DataStream: WC08579). 
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Similar to Li (2010), the second measure is the weighted average of property, plant, and 
equipment for all firms in the same industry scaled by total assets (thereafter CAPINTEN)17. This 
second measure has been frequently used in the literature as a proxy for entry barriers (e.g. DeFond 
& Hung, 2003; Li, 2010; Wang et al., 2011; Karuna, 2007) and measures the minimal investment 
required to enter a product market and is positively related to entry barriers. The CAPINTEN is an 
inverse measure of proprietary cost; higher CAPINTEN indicates higher entry costs and a less-
competitive environment. This study expects a negative sign for MVGROWTH and a positive sign 
for CAPINTEN.18 
       We use free cash flow to test the agency cost hypotheses (Smith & Pennathur, 2017; Astami 
et .al 2017: Gul & Tsui 1997; Chiang and Ko 2009; De Jong & Van Dijk, 2007; Chung, Firth & 
Kim., 2005; Griffin, Long & Sun, 2010; Wang et al., 2011; Jensen 1986). Early research has 
suggested that dividends to shareholders act as a mechanism for reducing agency costs, that is, it 
reduces the resources under the managers' control and the managers' power. They also keep them 
subject to monitoring by capital markets (Jensen 1986, Easterbrook 1984, Jensen 1988). Jensen 
(1986) developed a free cash flow proposition that hypothesises that managers endowed with free 
cash flow will invest it in negative net present value projects, rather than pay the funds out to 
shareholders. Managers prize investment because their privileges increase even when the firm 
invests in negative net-present-value projects (Jensen, 1986; Stultz, 1990). This is consistent with 
the empire-building proposition, that is, managers may engage in opportunistic behaviour and 
value-destroying activities to achieve personal benefit (Hope & Thomas, 2008). Thus, managers 
of firms with high free cash flow are more likely to be associated with an agency problem and 
                                                 
17 This is an industry weighted measure. Market share, calculated as the ratio of firm sales to industry aggregate sales, is used as the weight. A 
two-digit SIC code is used to identify the industry and all listed firms in the sample countries (Thomson Reuters database). 
18 CAPITINTEN is an inverse measure of proprietary cost. 
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conflict of interest and less likely to provide high-quality and SDQuantity. Thus, free cash flow 
per share is used to test the agency cost hypotheses, and the data are collected from the DataStream 
database. 
This study controls for a set of factors that influence segment disclosures. The models 
control for IFRS 8 impact, firm size (SIZE), industry (MANUF), leverage (LEVERAGE), 
profitability (PROFIT), segment structure (LOB), complexity (COMPLEX), and country-level 
enforcement and protection (ENFORCE and PROTECT). The models consider two other variables 
that potentially reflect the attributes of firm segmental structure (LOB and COMPLEX). For IFRS 
8, this study expects a positive sign is for SDQuality and a negative sign for SDQuantity (Aboud, 
Roberts & Zalata, 2018; Crawford et al., 2012; Leung & Verriest, 2015; Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 
2013). Consistent with the literature, (Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Raffournier, 1995; Watson, Shrives 
& Marston., 2002), we expect a positive sign for LEVERAGE and SIZE. As the literature has 
provided mixed results on the relationship between profitability and disclosure, this study prefers 
not to provide a sign for the variable PROFIT (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Kelly, 1994; Meek, 
Roberts & Gray, 1995). For a complexity variable, we expect firms with a complex segment 
structure (i.e. operate in many activities or a complex environment) to provide a greater number 
of segment disclosures. By contrast, the coefficient of LOB is more likely to be negative for the 
SDQuality; firms that report their operating segments using geographical regions are more likely 
to provide higher geographical disaggregation. Consistent with the literature (i.e. Daske et al., 
2008; Francis, Schipper & Vincent., 2005; Glaum et al., 2013; Miller & Reisel, 2012), this study 
expects a positive relationship among the level of investor protection (PROTECT), enforcement 
(ENFORCE), and segment disclosure. Table 2 provides a summary of definitions of the variables 
used in our models.  
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5. Results  
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of segment disclosures and their determinants. 
Panel A shows that segment disclosure quantity and quality changed after IFRS 8. The number of 
items disclosed decreased under IFRS 8, and the quality of segment disclosure substantially 
increased after IFRS 8. Consistently, the correlation matrix indicates a significant negative 
correlation between IFRS 8 and SDQuantity and a positive correction between IFRS 8 and 
SDQuality with IFRS 8. These findings are consistent with the literature on the impact of IFRS 8 
on the level of segment disclosures (Aboud, Roberts & Zalata, 2018; Crawford et al., 2012; Leung 
& Verriest, 2015; Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013). One of the main characteristics of our sample 
is it incorporates 2 years following IFRS 8. In the second year after the adoption of IFRS 8, the 
results imply nonsignificant changes for SDQuantity and SDQuality19. These results suggest that 
most firms do not significantly change what they report after fully adjusting for the standard, which 
occurred in 2009. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics in the Pre–SFAS 131 and Post–SFAS 131 periods 
  N Mean Median p25 p75 SD 
Pre- IFRS 8       
  SDQuality  270 0.318 0.241 0 0.543 0.328 
  SDQuantity  270 0.362 0.356 0.316 0.395 0.083 
  MVGROWTH 270 13.6 22.2 9.95 44.5 42.1 
  CAPINTEN 270 0.294 0.261 0.127 0.419 0.2 
  AGENCY 270 1.21 0.38 -0.092 1.6 2.74 
  COMPLEX 270 4.27 4 3 5.5 1.58 
  LOB 270 0.767 1 1 1 0.423 
  MANUF 270 0.682 1 0 1 0.467 
  SIZE 270 16.1 15.9 15 17.1 1.33 
  PROFIT 270 13.6 13.5 12.8 14.4 1.12 
                                                 
19 The mean scores of SDquantity and SDQuality are .46 and .34 in 2009 and .455 and .349 in 2010. Using parametric and non-parametric tests, 
we find insignificant changes in segment disclosure quantity and quality between 2009 and 2010.  
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  LEVERAGE 270 0.268 0.248 0.161 0.367 0.154 
  ENFORCE 270 0.523 0.5 0 1 0.421 
  PROTECT 270 2.97 3 2 4 1.43 
Post-IFRS 8       
  SDQuality  270 0.448 0.424 0.141 0.75 0.341 
  SDQuantity  270 0.354 0.351 0.298 0.414 0.093 
  MVGROWTH 270 36.1 25.9 5.28 58.8 45.3 
  CAPINTEN 270 0.304 0.261 0.123 0.45 0.218 
  AGENCY 270 1.03 0.325 -0.163 1.72 2.64 
  COMPLEX 270 4.55 4.5 3.5 5.5 1.75 
  LOB 270 0.766 1 1 1 0.424 
  MANUF 270 0.706 1 0 1 0.456 
  SIZE 270 16.1 16 15.2 17.1 1.35 
  PROFIT 270 13.5 13.3 12.7 14.2 1.18 
  LEVERAGE 270 0.266 0.256 0.15 0.366 0.15 
  ENFORCE 270 0.516 0.5 0 1 0.429 
  PROTECT 270 2.92 3 2 4 1.44 
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Panel B: Correlation matrix   
  SDQuality SDQuantity IFRS 8 MVGROWTH CAPINTEN AGENCY COMPLEX LOB MANUF SIZE PROFIT LEVERAGE ENFORCE PROTECT 
                 
SDQuality 1               
SDQuantity 0.059* 1              
IFRS 8 0.186*** -0.113*** 1             
MVGROWTH 0.022 -0.089** 0.536*** 1            
CAPINTEN -0.004 0.097** -0.013 0.006 1           
AGENCY -0.039 -0.015 -0.071** 0.032 -0.002 1          
COMPLEX 0.168*** 0.161*** 0.070** 0.059* -0.089** -0.016 1         
LOB -0.094 0.121 -0.002 0.023 0.020 -0.025 0.215 1        
MANUF -0.065* 0.057* 0.0059 0.032 0.014 0.031 0.167*** 0.131*** 1       
SIZE 0.128*** 0.255*** 0.019 -0.125*** -0.001 -0.131*** 0.202*** -0.031 0.170*** 1      
PROFIT 0.039 0.100*** -0.054** -0.086*** 0.011 -0.091*** 0.067** -0.106*** 0.066** 0.723*** 1     
LEVERAGE -0.025 0.023 0.006 -0.068* 0.056 0.002 -0.063* -0.050 0.004 0.142*** 0.119*** 1    
ENFORCE 0.030 0.060* -0.002 -0.043 -0.031 0.052 0.042 0.073** 0.142*** 0.006 -0.119 -0.045 1   
PROTECT 0.110*** 0.100*** -0.001 0.020 0.049 -0.050 -0.053 0.026 -0.092*** -0.064** 0.076** -0.001 -0.46 1 
Table (3) presents the descriptive statistics. Panel (A) describes the variables for the full sample. Panel B shows the Pearson correlations between the variables. Variables 
definitions table (2) 
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5.2 Main results   
Table 4 shows the impact of proprietary and agency motives on the quantity and quality of 
the reported segment information and how the introduction of the principle-based IFRS 8 shapes 
this impact. The quantity of segment disclosure (SDQuantity) is measured by the disclosure index 
and quality is measured by the level of geographical information disaggregation. The overall 
explanatory powers of the multivariate analysis show reasonable R2 (15.6% and 15.1%) for the 
models, and this result is consistent with the disclosure literature and, in particular, the segment-
reporting literature (e.g. Prather-Kinsey, 2004; Tsakumis, Doupnik & Seese 2006). 
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 Table 4: Impact of proprietary and agency motives on the quantity and quality of the reported segment 
information. 
 1. SDQuality 2.SDQuantity 3.SDQuality with interaction 4.SDQuantity with Interaction 
    IFRS 8 0.156*** -0.013 0.164*** -0.012 
    MVGROWTH -0.092*** -0.0026 -0.002 -0.005 
    CAPINTEN 0.0462** 0.0310 0.043 0.029 
    AGENCY -0.011** 0.03** -0.014** 0.003** 
    IFRS 8* MVGROWTH    -0.001** 0.005 
    IFRS 8* CAPINTEN   -0.012 0.004 
    IFRS 8*AGENCY   0.008 -0.002 
    COMPLEX 0.052*** 0.002 0.054*** 0.002 
     LOB -0.081** 0.015* -0.080** 0.014* 
     MANUF -0.087*** 0.003 -0.087*** 0.003 
     SIZE 0.0319** 0.031*** 0.031** 0.030*** 
     PROFIT -0.035** -0.021*** -0.036** -0.021*** 
     LEVERAGE -0.124 -0.023 -0.132 -0.023 
      ENFORCE 0.080** 0.036*** 0.078** 0.036*** 
      PROTECT 0.033*** 0.014*** 0.033*** 0.014*** 
Cons 0.096 0.0656 0.125 0.0645 
N 540 540 540 540 
adj. R-sq 0.151 0.156 0.155 0.159 
Robust cluster SE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Table 4 presents the findings of pooled regression that examine the impact of proprietary and agency costs on segment 
disclosures’ quantity and quality. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems20. Variables definitions table (2) 
 
5.2.1 Effect of proprietary and agency cost on segment disclosures’ quantity and quality 
We regressed the proprietary cost proxies against the quantity and quality of segment 
disclosures. Two proxies are introduced to account for the proprietary cost: MVGROWTH and 
CAPINTEN. The results are presented in Table 4, columns 1 and 2. Regarding SDQuality, the 
results suggest that firms with larger proprietary costs are less likely to disclose high-quality 
segment disclosures because the coefficients of MVGROWTH and CAPINTEN are significant in 
column 1 at 1% and 5%, respectively.21 By contrast, the two proxies of proprietary cost are not 
                                                 
20 When we employ the standard errors clustered by country, the main findings are qualitatively similar. 
21 CAPINTEN is an inverse measure of proprietary cost. 
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significant for SDQuantity and imply that managers are less likely to consider proprietary costs as 
a motive for decreasing the volume of segment information (column 2). 
Therefore, the findings are partially consistent with H1 and suggest that proprietary cost is 
a motive for providing only lower segment disclosure quality. The quality of segment disclosure, 
measured by country-level disclosure, is of a high proprietary nature that could help rivals beat the 
incumbent firm and provides precise information regarding sources of profit and firms’ 
diversification strategy. This is consistent with the discretionary disclosure theory, that is, 
management disclosure choices, namely, aggregation decisions, are driven by the proprietary costs 
(Clinch & Verrecchia, 1997; Verrecchia, 1983, 2001). The findings also indicate that the 
management disclosure choice depends on the segment disclosure dimensions. The results suggest 
that proprietary cost is a disincentive for only SDQuality and firms that anticipate competitive 
harm are less likely to decrease segment disclosure quantity.  
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5.2.2 Effect of agency cost on segment disclosures’ quantity and quality 
We investigate the relationship between agency problem, proxy by free cash flow 
(AGENCY), and segment disclosure quantity and quality. The findings show that the coefficients 
of AGENCY are significant for the quantity and quality dimensions (Table 4, columns 1 and 2). 
Notably, although the coefficient of AGENCY is positive and significant for SDQuantity at 5%, 
the same coefficient is negative and significant, as predicted for SDQuality at 5%. These findings 
suggest that in the presence of the agency problem, firms are more likely to report lower SDQuality 
and a higher SDQuantity.  
Although this finding is partially against the prediction in H2, it is consistent with agency 
theory. Management segment disclosure choices are a function of cost benefits’ trade off, and the 
agency cost has a substantial role in explaining this phenomenon. In the presence of agency costs, 
managers tend to increase the quantity of information reported to demonstrate that their actions in 
the interest of shareholders and obtain the potential capital market benefits associated with 
disclosure. By contrast, managers decrease the quality of segment disclosures through reporting 
less country-specific information to mitigate external monitoring and hide inefficient allocation of 
resources that might be used to achieve empire building, as argued by Hope and Thomas (2008). 
Our findings are consistent with the literature in the US context: managers use the vague country-
level materiality guidelines to aggregate geographic disclosures (Hope, Ma and Thomas, 2013; 
Akamah, Hope and Thomas, 2018; Cereola et al., 2017) 
Regarding the control variables, the coefficients of size (SIZE) are positive and significant, 
suggesting that large firms provide SDQuality and SDQuantity. The coefficient of PROFIT is 
negative and significant. The coefficients of LOB are positive and significant in the SDQuantity 
models and negative in the SDQuality models. This result implies that firms that define operating 
segments by using a line of business have the highest SDQuantity and lowest SDQuality, as 
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measured by geographical disaggregation. In addition, the quality of segment information varies 
based on the industry because the coefficient of MANUF is negative and significant. The results 
also suggest that SDQuality is higher on average for firms with complex activities and that operate 
in a variety of regions because the coefficient of COMPLEX is positive and significant. 
Furthermore, the regression analysis incorporates a dummy variable, IFRS 8, with a value 
of 1 for post-IFRS 8 and 0 for pre-IFRS 8, to control for the impact of regulation. The results show 
that the adoption of IFRS 8 is associated with an increase in SDQuality and agree with the literature 
from the UK and EU (Aboud, Roberts & Zalata, 2018; Crawford et al., 2012; Nichols, Street, & 
Tarca, 2013). For cross-country variables, the coefficients of ENFORCE and PROTECT are 
positive and significant at 1% in SDQuality, and SDQuantity models suggested greater segment 
disclosure quality and quantity in countries with strong enforcement and investor protection 
systems.  
5.2.3 Role of IFRS 8 in shaping the impact of proprietary and agency cost on the quality and 
quantity segment disclosures 
We expect the negative relationship between the reporting disincentives (i.e. agency and 
proprietary costs) and segment disclosures to be more recognisable or dominant post IFRS 8 due 
to the high discretion inherent in IFRS 8. Notably, the findings (Table 4, columns 3 and 4) indicate 
that only the coefficient of the interaction between IFRS 8 and MVGROWTH is negative and 
significant at 5%, for SDQuality. This negative significant coefficient suggests that the association 
between proprietary cost and segment disclosures’ quality increased after the adoption of IFRS 8; 
additionally, it implies that managers of firms with high proprietary costs use the discretion of 
IFRS 8 (i.e. aggregation criteria and materiality level of country-level disclosure) to report a lower 
quality of segment disclosures; thus, proprietary costs limit the anticipated benefits of IFRS 8.  
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These findings are consistent with Lee, Walker, & Christensen (2008) and Christensen, 
Hail, and Leuz (2015), that is, reporting incentives are more relevant than accounting standards in 
determining accounting quality, and the adoption of IFRS may not lead to higher quality 
accounting when the preparers have incentives to not disclose certain information. The interactions 
between IFRS 8 and both capital intensity and agency cost are not significant.  
6. Additional analysis 
The question of how to report segment information has been controversial. Disclosure 
quality is a tricky concept and its measurement is complex in general. Beyer et al. (2010, p.311) 
asserted that a sensible economic definition and direct measure of financial reporting quality are 
missing from the literature. The literature has introduced various definitions and measures of 
segment disclosure quality (Rennie & Emmanuel 1992; Berger & Hann 2003; Ettredge et al 2006; 
Wang et al 2011; Tsakumis, Doupnik & Seese 2006; Nichols, Street, & Cereola, 2012; André, 
Filip & Moldovan 2016; Aboud, Roberts & Zalata, 2018). In this study, we use the country-specific 
disclosures to measure the segment disclosure quality because country-level disclosure provides 
the finest and, potentially, most useful information. Nevertheless, a variety of alternative levels of 
disaggregation have been observed. For instance, subcontinental disclosures have privilege over 
continental or more aggregated disclosures. Additionally, some firms provide country-specific 
information and aggregate the remaining results into one segment such as ‘other;’ other firms 
report only the named continent segments, such as ‘Americas’ or ‘Europe.’ In these cases, the 
overall disaggregation of segmental reporting may be greater for firms with fewer pieces of 
country-specific information.  
Therefore, consistent with Kou and Hussain (2007), Doupnik and Seese (2001), and 
Hussain (1997), an alternative proxy is used to measure the overall disaggregation of the 
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geographical information. This proxy is computed as the sum of individual segment sales, divided 
by total sales, and multiplied by the appropriated weight for that type of segment as follows: 
∑
𝐺𝑖′𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 𝑇𝐺𝑆 
𝑁
𝑁=1
∗ 𝐺𝑊𝑖   
Where      N: number of geographical areas/segments  
                 Gi’s: revenue for geographic area/segment i 
                 GWi: geographical weight 
                 TGS: total segments/areas revenues  
Consistent with the literature, the finest level of disclosure is country, which is weighted 
by a scale of three. A scale of two is applied to continent or sub-continent segments, such as ‘The 
Americas’ or ‘North America.’ A scale of one is for multi-continent segments, such as ‘Europe 
and Asia.’ A scale of 0 is for unspecified segments such as ‘other.’ Using this proxy, the results 
are reported in Table 5. The reported results are consistent with the main results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (5) Effect of proprietary and agency motives on the quality of the reported segment information by 
using an overall geographical disaggregation score. 
  SDQuality SDQuality with interaction 
IFRS 8 0.163*** 0.165** 
MVGROWTH -0.082** -0.00145 
CAPINTEN 0.159** -0.0986 
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AGENCY -0.152* -0.0318** 
IFRS 8* MVGROWTH  -0.0815* 
IFRS 8* CAPINTEN  -0.012 
IFRS 8*AGENCY  -0.0347 
COMPLEX 0.183*** 0.183*** 
LOB -0.361*** -0.356*** 
MANUF -0.172*** -0.172*** 
SIZE 0.0022 0.00477 
PROFIT -0.0521 -0.0545 
LEVERAGE -0.302* -0.298 
ENFORCE 0.276*** 0.271*** 
PROTECT 0.0419** 0.0423** 
Cons 2.151*** 2.141*** 
N 540 540 
adj. R-sq 0.228 0.228 
Robust cluster SE Yes Yes 
Notes: Table 5 presents the findings of pooled regression that examine the impact of proprietary and agency costs on segment 
disclosures’ quality by using an overall geographical disaggregation score. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Variables definitions table (2) 
 
Our results support the notion that segment disclosure quality varies even under a common 
accounting standard, and strong investor protection and enforcement systems is associated with 
greater quantity and quality of segment disclosure. Notably, the impact of interaction between 
regulatory intervention, reporting incentives, and institutional factors on segment disclosure 
practices remains controversial (Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013; Ball, 2006; Lee, Walker, & 
Christensen 2008). In line with these arguments, we introduce three level interactions between the 
country-level proxies (ENFORCE and PROTECT), the principle-based IFRS 8, and the reporting 
disincentives (agency and proprietary cost). The results indicate that none of the interactions are 
significant (not tabulated).    
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study addresses the role of reporting disincentives in determining SDQuality and SDQuantity. 
In particular, this study examines the role of agency and proprietary motives in precluding 
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segmental disclosures by using a sample of the largest firms in the EU during 4 successive years. 
Consistent with proprietary cost being a key factor in disclosure quality choice, the findings 
suggest that firms with anticipated competitive harm are more likely to provide lower-quality 
disclosures and less likely to decrease segment disclosure quantity. The findings also indicate 
that the introduction of IFRS 8 increased the chance of withholding or reporting lower-quality 
segment information for proprietary reasons. These findings are consistent with the argument that 
the anticipated benefits of a principle-based standard such as IFRS 8 could be limited due to the 
level of managerial discretion it affords (Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013; Christensen, Hail, & Leuz, 
2015). The findings also imply that reporting incentives such as proprietary cost motives dominate 
accounting standards when determining accounting quality, which is consistent with the findings 
of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006), and Christensen, Hail, and 
Leuz (2015).  
Agency theory suggests that managers tend to increase disclosures with the objective of 
diminishing agency costs, and managers under the self-interest concept are likely to withhold 
information. We observe that managers react to their personal incentives by providing lower 
segment disclosure quality to avoid external monitoring or mask inefficient decisions. In the 
meantime, they are aware of the importance of disclosure for mitigating agency cost; therefore, 
they increase the SDQuantity instead.  
These findings make three contributions to the segmental disclosure literature. First, the 
findings add to the understanding of the impact of proprietary cost and opportunistic behaviour on 
segmental reporting choices, given that few studies have investigated the agency and proprietary 
cost of segmental information outside the US (Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013).  
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Second, the findings provide empirical evidence of the impact of the interaction between 
the principle-based IFRS 8 and the reporting disincentives regarding segment disclosure of quality 
and quantity. The analysis showed that the negative association between proprietary costs and 
segmental reporting quality is stronger under a principle-based IFRS 8, suggesting that managers 
may consider engaging in strategic reporting that limits anticipated competitive harm easier. By 
contrast, the empirical results based on US data have suggested that the effects of proprietary costs 
and agency costs on companies’ segment reporting quality have not changed after the 
implementation of FAS 131 (Ettredge et al 2006; Wang et al 2011)22  
Third, the findings show how reporting incentives affect the segment disclosure quality 
and quantity choices differently. For example, although segment disclosure quality is significantly 
important when testing agency and proprietary costs, the quantity of information is either 
nonsignificant or presents different conclusions. These findings suggest that the findings in the 
literature may have been dependent on the disclosure dimension employed  
Our research has implications for policymakers and financial statement users. Firstly, this 
study provides feedback on the debatable IFRS 8, given that it has been approved after further 
investigation and analysis by the European Commission. Consistent with IASB post-
implementation review, our findings indicate that the quality of segmental reporting improved 
following IFRS 8. Our findings suggest that the disclosure by country has improved, and the 
number of line items has decreased. These findings also inform financial statement users concerns 
                                                 
22 Ettredge et al (2006) and Wang et al (2011) used cross segment variability to measure segment reporting quality, 
but we employ the level of geographical disaggregation as a proxy for segment reporting quality.    
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regarding the quality of geographical disclosure acknowledged in the post-implementation review 
of IFRS 8.  
Secondly, our results extend the literature by indicating that the anticipated benefits of 
IFRS 8 are limited when the preparers have incentives to not disclose (i.e. high proprietary costs). 
The aggregation criterion and materiality are two vital issues that could cause practical problems 
for preparers and auditors (IASB, 2013). IFRS 8 allows managers to use a high materiality 
threshold for purposes of individual country disclosures (see, Akamah, Hope and Thomas, 2018; 
Cereola et al., 2017). In addition, investors believe that too much discretion regarding the 
aggregation of segments and materiality decision could limit the usefulness of the information 
(IASB, 2013). For instance, Cereola et al. (2017) observed mixed results regarding materiality 
threshold and concluded that management may be interpreting the vague wording of ‘material’ to 
either disclose or conceal information about specific countries, depending on management’s view 
of the benefit or detriment to the company (p.128). Therefore, we assert that users of segmental 
information may benefit from clear guidance when identifying a material threshold for country-
specific disclosure.  
Thirdly, the findings support the argument of the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group and European Standard Setters: the assessment of stewardship should take a place alongside 
decision-usefulness to ensure that the provided information helps decision-making related to 
stewardship, such as efficiency or capability of management, and an assessment of whether 
remuneration is excessive or unjust (ASB, 2007). Segmental information has been considered an 
important tool to control corporate managers because it requires them to justify the results of their 
stewardship; further, segmental information may help to improve or eliminate substandard 
operations, to the ultimate benefit of the stockholders and the economy in general (SEC, 1967). 
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Segmental information reveals information about firms’ diversification strategies and the extent 
of resource transfers between segments (Berger & Hann 2003; Bens & Monahan, 2004; Hope & 
Thomas, 2008). Therefore, such information could lead to a reduction in information asymmetry 
and facilitates improved external monitoring of managers (Berger & Hann 2003; Bens & 
Monahan, 2004; Hope & Thomas, 2008).  
             We employ two proxies of proprietary cost, but the measurement of proprietary cost is a 
complicated and debatable topic (i.e. Bozanic, Dietrich & Johnson.2017, André, Filip & Moldovan 
2016, Wang et al., 2011; Li 2010; Berger & Hann 2007; Bamber and Cheon 1998; Ali, Klasa & 
Yeung.2014; Lang & Sul, 2014). Thus, the measurement of proprietary and agency costs is a 
limitation for our study. Further research could examine the same topic by using different proxies 
of proprietary and agency costs.   
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